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Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an Optimal Central Bank Contract?
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  • 2000Open mouth operations250 cited
  • 2009Inflation Targeting: What Have We Learned?*250 cited
  • 2015The Politics of Central Bank Independence208 cited
  • 2001How Do Central Banks Talk196 cited
  • 1999Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence178 cited
  • 1999Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy124 cited
  • 1998The Output-inflation Tradeoff and Central Bank Reform: Evidence From New Zealand99 cited
  • 2003Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting86 cited
  • 1995Inflation targeting in the 1990s: The experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom86 cited
  • 1998Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?85 cited
  • 1997CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPAL‐AGENT PROBLEM80 cited
  • 2002Political Parties and Monetary Commitments77 cited
  • 2010The Politics of Monetary Policy72 cited
  • 1998The Economics of Central Banking67 cited
  • 1997Inflation Targeting in Practice65 cited

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  • 2010Politics and Monetary Policy55 cited