Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence

Helge Berger · Jakob de Haan · Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

512 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Economic Surveys

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Global Financial Crisis and Policies

Abstract

This paper reviews recent research on central bank independence (CBI). After we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness, research in which the inflationary bias is endogenised is reviewed. Finally, the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on CBI are discussed. We conclude that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation is quite robust.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 512 citations exist upstream.

Cited by

2003Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work 2021Central bank mandates, sustainability objectives and the promotion of green finance 2011Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis 2003Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators 2008Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future 2007Whither Monetary and Financial Stability? The Implications of Evolving Policy Regimes 2008Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness 2003Globalization and Global Disinflation

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.