THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL DISCRETION IN POST‐COMMUNIST CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF HUNGARY

Abstract

This article addresses the discrepancy between attempts to establish professional, de‐politicized civil services and the politicization of personnel policy at the central government level of post‐communist countries. It develops the concept of formal political discretion as an analytical tool for the assessment of how and to what extent legislative frameworks governing civil services provide institutional conditions for the de‐politicization of personnel policy. The case of Hungary shows that since the change of regime in 1989/90, four civil service reforms have led to the adoption, implementation and revision of civil service legislation that has gradually reduced the possibilities for government ministers to exercise political discretion over personnel policy. Civil service reforms have also led to the institutionalization of various discretionary instruments which ministers can and have used to politicize civil service affairs. The adoption and implementation of civil service laws therefore does not necessarily lead to the de‐politicization of civil services.

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