Article1990

A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits

474 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Journal of Political Science

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Electoral Systems and Political Participation Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

Empirical studies of distributive politics fail to offer any systematic evidence of a relationship between committee seniority in Congress and the geographic distribution of federal benefits. These findings are at odds with many descriptive accounts of the seniority norm for which such a relationship is a presupposition. Evidence and intuition appear at odds with each other. This study offers a partial reconciliation. The death of Senator Henry Scoop Jackson provides the somewhat macabre backdrop to a novel empirical examination of the seniority/benefit relationship. Evidence is provided through stock market reactions to Jackson's death across various constituent interests of Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn, Jackson's successor as ranking minority member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. The results support the hypothesis that a seniority/benefit relationship exists.

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References

1964CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*1958An Economic Theory of Democracy.1970EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK*1975THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]1985Using daily stock returns 1966Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market 1983A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence 1980Measuring security price performance

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