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A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits
16 references·16 citing·33 second hopsampled
A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits (1990)A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority a…The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information (2003)The Adjustment of Stock Price…Using daily stock returns (1985)Using daily stock returnsCongressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms (1984)Congressional Oversight Overl…Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission (1983)Bureaucratic Discretion or Co…A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983)A Theory of Competition Among…Measuring security price performance (1980)Measuring security price perf…Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, by Richard F. Fenno, Jr. (1979)Home Style: House Members in …Congressmen in Committees. By Richard F. FennoJr. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973. Pp. xvii, 302. $7.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.) (1977)Congressmen in Committees. By…THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS …Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. 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this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

  • 1964CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*19,431 cited
  • 1958An Economic Theory of Democracy.18,594 cited
  • 1970EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK*15,723 cited
  • 1975THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]6,743 cited
  • 1985Using daily stock returns6,497 cited
  • 1966Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market4,896 cited
  • 1983A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence4,118 cited
  • 1980Measuring security price performance3,330 cited
  • 1975Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew3,130 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

  • 1972Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing3,097 cited
  • 2003The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information3,063 cited
  • 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,936 cited
  • 1964American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory2,513 cited
  • 1979Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, by Richard F. Fenno, Jr.1,601 cited
  • 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
  • 1977Congressmen in Committees. By Richard F. FennoJr. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973. Pp. xvii, 302. $7.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)945 cited
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    • 2013Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying368 cited
    • 1992Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often356 cited
    • 2015Valuing Changes in Political Networks: Evidence from Campaign Contributions to Close Congressional Elections342 cited
    • 2018Political Connections and Allocative Distortions331 cited
    • 2010High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world326 cited
    • 2009MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics318 cited
    • 2006The Jeffords Effect316 cited
    • 2013The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors311 cited
    • 2011Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?303 cited
    • 2012Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power281 cited
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