VERs, QUID PRO QUO DFI AND VIEs: POLITICAL-ECONOMY-THEORETIC ANALYSES

Jagdish N. Bhagwati

74 citations0/0 files storedInternational Economic Journal

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Global trade and economics International Business and FDI COVID-19, Geopolitics, Technology, Migration

Abstract

The paper addresses three different phenomena: VERs, their causes and consequences; Quid Pro Quo direct foreign investment; and VIEs. Quid Pro Quo direct foreign investment relates to investment that is undertaken in one period to influence the probability of protection being imposed in the next period. VIEs are “voluntary import expansions” which define quantity outcomes in the domestic markets of the country on which they are imposed, as when U.S. requires that a certain share of the Japanese market in an industry must be supplied by U.S. exports by a certain date. [410]

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References

2008The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society 1968More on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas 1982Import Competition and Response 1978Direct foreign investment : a Japanese model of multinational business operations 1986The Extent of Nontariff Barriers to Industrial Countries' Imports 1986Measuring quality change in quota-constrained import markets: The Case of U.S. Footwear 1985The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy 1979The Quality of Imports and the Differential Welfare Effects of Tariffs, Quotas, and Quality Controls as Protective Devices

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2007THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN FIRMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1987Trade in Services and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations 1993Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy 1989QUID PRO QUOFOREIGN INVESTMENT*1994TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK†2002Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment: implications for market-opening trade policy

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