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Manipulation and the Pareto rule
16 references·1 citing·21 second hop
Manipulation and the Pareto rule (1979)Manipulation and the Pareto ruleAggregation and revelation of preferences (1979)Aggregation and revelation of…Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes (1978)Straightforwardness of Game F…Decision Theory and Social Ethics (1978)Decision Theory and Social Et…The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance (1977)The Manipulation of Social Ch…Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness (1977)Strategy-Proofness and Social…Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance (1977)Manipulation of Schemes that …Manipulation of social choice functions (1976)Manipulation of social choice…Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…On the stability of sincere voting situations (1973)On the stability of sincere v…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory (1972)Even-chance lotteries in soci…Collective Choice and Social Welfare. (1972)Collective Choice and Social …Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Collective Choice and Social …Theory of voting (1969)Theory of votingStability in Voting (1961)Stability in VotingUtility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules (1960)Utility, Strategy, and Social…Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings (1992)Strategy-proofness of social …Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Rights, Games and Social Choice (1981)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized (2000)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Human Rights and Capabilities (2005)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)Approval Voting (1978)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)House Allocation with Existing Tenants (1999)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (1984)Incentive and informational properties of preference questions (2007)On Economic Inequality (1973)Effects of Public Opinion on Policy (1983)Poverty and Famines (1983)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,247 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,837 cited
  • 1972Collective Choice and Social Welfare2,566 cited
  • 1972Collective Choice and Social Welfare.656 cited
  • 1969Theory of voting634 cited
  • 1977Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance443 cited
  • 1979Aggregation and revelation of preferences430 cited
  • 1960Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules407 cited
  • 1976Manipulation of social choice functions226 cited
  • 1961Stability in Voting189 cited
  • 1977Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness164 cited
  • 1977The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance141 cited
  • 1978Decision Theory and Social Ethics124 cited
  • 1978Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes112 cited
  • 1972Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory90 cited
  • 1973On the stability of sincere voting situations

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  • 1992Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings52 cited