Strategic Planning Behavior and Interurban Competition for Airport Development

Abstract

This paper analyzes how two interurban competitions for MOCs emerged and evolved, the factors in MOC location decisions, and how the cities negotiated and packaged their offers. The analysis shows that the airlines strategically manipulated governments to extract locational incentives and to further other corporate agendas. We also examine how operational considerations affected the MOC site selection, by using a gravity model to identify the most efficient locations for the United and American facilities (sites that did not correspond exactly with the sites they finally chose). The findings suggest that planners should (1) assemble better intelligence about the locational requirements for facilities they seek, (2) evaluate the fiscal impacts of incentive packages before offering them to corporations, and (3) plan strategically when engaged in these interurban contests.

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