Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games

Jeffrey S. Banks

157 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Journal of Political Science

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Game Theory and Applications International Relations and Foreign Policy Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one \nplayer possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war. I derive conclusions \nabout equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints, where these constraints \nhold regardless of the game form; hence, the qualitative results are "game-free." I show that the \nhigher the informed player's payoff from war, the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling \nthe dispute short of war, and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war. The latter result rationalizes \nthe monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war. I then \nprovide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the \nprobability of war.

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem 1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game 1981The war trap 1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility 1979Incentives and incomplete information

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2008Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War 2010Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game-Free Analysis of International Conflict 1997Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation 1995The success and use of economic sanctions 2017Information, Uncertainty, and War 2011Military Threats

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