The Role of Performance Management in the Steering of Executive Agencies: Layered, Imbedded, or Disjointed?

Abstract

This article analyzes the Norwegian state administration’s performance management practices, based on a study of performance contracts between 77 Norwegian executive agencies and their parent ministries. The results show that most performance objectives target agency outputs and outcomes, suggesting that the “right version” of performance management is practiced. Two perspectives are developed to hypothesize about performance management’s relationship to legal, fiscal, legal, and direct behavioral steering. The layering perspective assumes that ministries use performance management to repair gaps left by limitations in the other control instruments. The imbedding perspective assumes that ministries develop performance management practices that uphold intentions for delegated autonomy. The layering perspective receives some support, but overall it seems that decisions about how to use each governance instrument are quite disjointed, without much concern for harmony with how other instruments are used. The article also shows that performance management practices are influenced by contextual factors like the number of tasks an agency performs, organizational heterogeneity, and whether an agency was established before or after the general introduction of performance management.

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