Articlehybrid2004

Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions

146 citations0/0 files storedGames and Economic Behavior

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Experimental sealed-bid first-price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given. The concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a principle of ex-post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison, captures the data.

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References

1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 2000ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition 2003Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction 1995The Handbook of experimental economics 2003Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction 2004Advances in Behavioral Economics 1995Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term

Cited by

2006Regret in auctions: theory and evidence 2005Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets 2007A Comparison of Buyer-Determined and Price-Based Multiattribute Mechanisms 2012Increasing Revenue by Decreasing Information in Procurement Auctions 2006Price floors and competition 2014Impulse balance in the newsvendor game 2008Interorganizational Relationships and Bidding Behavior in Industrial Online Reverse Auctions 2011Behavioral economic engineering

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