TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: II. TWO KINDS OF FORESIGHT AND FORESIGHT THEORIZING Monograph Supplement 4-V23

Abstract

-Drawing on contributions by H. Bergson, J. P. Guilford, A. 0. Lovejoy, H. Rorschach, J. Ruesch and W. Kees, H. A. Simon, J. L. Singer and J. S. Antrobus, and G. L. S. Shackle, the essay develops a cognitive dualism involving, on the one hand, Guilford's perceptual foresight, Simon's foresight, Bergson's intellect, Romantic Idealism's Verstand, Rorschach form responses, Singer and Antrobus' objective daydreaming, and Ruesch .ind Kees' digital codific a t i o n a n d , on the other, Guilford's conceptual \o~esrghc, Shackle's foresight, Bergson's intttifion, Romantic Idealism's Vernunft (Vernunfc-Anschauung, intellekluelle Anschauung), Rorschach movement responses, Singer and Anrrobus' subjective daydreaming, and Ruesch and Kees' analogic codification.

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