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Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Fractional Assignments
16 references·5 citing·31 second hop
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References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 1999Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes624 cited
  • 1987A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context486 cited
  • 2010Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing422 cited
  • 2005On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing274 cited
  • 2005Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming218 cited
  • 2008Optimal mechanism design and money burning194 cited
  • 2006Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions189 cited
  • 2006On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive164 cited
  • 2005Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders164 cited
  • 2008On the Hardness of Being Truthful146 cited
  • 2010Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design111 cited
  • 2007Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

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105 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Mechanism Design and Approximation119 cited
  • 2012Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian59 cited
  • 2010Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design49 cited
  • 2013Bayesian Mechanism Design46 cited
  • 2013Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and Other Generalizations40 cited