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Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion
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Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion (2002)Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion …Adverse Selection in the Labor Market (2018)Adverse Selection in the Labo…A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms (1999)A Theory of Wage and Promotio…CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis (1997)CEO turnover and outside succ…Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings (1993)Assignment Models of the Dist…Pay Equality and Industrial Politics (1989)Pay Equality and Industrial P…Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior (1989)Efficient Capital Markets, In…Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory (1988)Compensation and Incentives: …An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations (1988)An Economic Approach to Influ…Adverse Selection in the Labour Market (1986)Adverse Selection in the Labo…Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments (1985)Prizes and Incentives in Elim…Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency (1984)Job Assignments, Signalling, …Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings (1982)Authority, Control, and the D…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…Why Is There Mandatory Retirement? (1979)Why Is There Mandatory Retire…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis (1962)Investment in Human Capital: …The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes. (1981)Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis (1992)The Socialist System (1992)Executive compensation (2008)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets (1999)Psychological foundations of incentives (2002)Identity and the Economics of Organizations (2005)Job Market Signaling (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information (1985)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)The economic implications of corporate financial reporting (2005)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Management entrenchment (1989)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective (2001)Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards (2005)Inherited Control and Firm Performance (2006)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Performance Pay and Productivity (2000)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)AFFECT- AND COGNITION-BASED TRUST AS FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERPERSONAL COOPERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS. (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003)The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings (1967)Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty (1989)Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective (2010)A Theory of Wage Dynamics (1982)Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages (1995)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)What's the difference? diversity constructs as separation, variety, or disparity in organizations (2007)The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development (2011)Top Incomes in the Long Run of History (2011)Contest success functions (1996)Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry (1996)
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References

  • 1962Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis8,056 cited
  • 1981Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts4,568 cited
  • 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts3,033 cited
  • 1989Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior2,585 cited
  • 1979Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?2,037 cited
  • 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
  • 1997CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis1,265 cited
  • 1982Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings1,213 cited
  • 1989Pay Equality and Industrial Politics1,205 cited
  • 1985Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments1,137 cited
  • 1993Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings861 cited
  • 1988An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations775 cited
  • 1984Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency523 cited
  • 1999A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms460 cited
  • 2018Adverse Selection in the Labor Market441 cited
  • 1986Adverse Selection in the Labour Market

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