Citation map · Study

SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Facilitating Normative Judgments of Conditional Probability: Frequency or Nested Sets?

10 references·16 citing·37 second hop

FromToDepth

this work references cited by second hop

References

1975Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases22,647 cited
1973On the psychology of prediction.6,201 cited
1983Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.3,990 cited
1991How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”1,160 cited
1994Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment.810 cited
1982Judgments of and by representativeness632 cited
1994Why the distinction between single-event probabilities and frequencies is important for psychology (and vice versa)259 cited
2002Representation facilitates reasoning: what natural frequencies are and what they are not252 cited
1999Frequency, Probability, and Prediction: Easy Solutions to Cognitive Illusions?137 cited
1989Intuitive reasoning about probability: Theoretical and experimental analyses of the “problem of three prisoners”130 cited

Cited by

2009Semantic coherence and fallacies in estimating joint probabilities59 cited
2012Evolutionary modules and Bayesian facilitation: The role of general cognitive resources52 cited
2015Good fences make for good neighbors but bad science: a review of what improves Bayesian reasoning and why51 cited
2013The effect of iconicity of visual displays on statistical reasoning: evidence in favor of the null hypothesis

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

45 cited

2015Comprehension and computation in Bayesian problem solving43 cited

2019How to Improve Performance in Bayesian Inference Tasks: A Comparison of Five Visualizations42 cited

2017The rational status of quantum cognition.40 cited

2007Converging evidence supports fuzzy-trace theory's nested sets hypothesis, but not the frequency hypothesis34 cited

2018Why Can Only 24% Solve Bayesian Reasoning Problems in Natural Frequencies: Frequency Phobia in Spite of Probability Blindness33 cited

2013Words, numbers, & numeracy: Diminishing individual differences in Bayesian reasoning32 cited

2015The conjunction fallacy, confirmation, and quantum theory: Comment on Tentori, Crupi, and Russo (2013).27 cited

2020Different Visualizations Cause Different Strategies When Dealing With Bayesian Situations26 cited

2008Enhancing probabilistic reasoning: The role of causal graphs, statistical format and numerical skills24 cited

2016Developing expert political judgment: The impact of training and practice on judgmental accuracy in geopolitical forecasting.23 cited

2015Beating the base-rate fallacy: an experimental approach on the effectiveness of different information presentation formats21 cited

2008Frequency formats, probability formats, or problem structure? A test of the nested-sets hypothesis in an extensional reasoning task21 cited