Russellian Acquaintance Revisited

Abstract

In Bertrand Russell's writings during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century there occur two rather different distinctions that involve his much-discussed, technical notion of acquaintance.The first is the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the second, the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths.This article examines the nature and philosophical purpose of these two distinctions, while also tracing the evolution of Russell's notion of acquaintance in the first two decades of the twentieth century.It argues that, when he first expressly formulates his Principle of Acquaintance in 1903, Russell's chief concern is to appeal to the first distinction to argue against a certain tightly restrictive epistemology of understanding that he finds in the writings of William James.By contrast, when in 1911 he begins to place emphasis on the second distinction, his concern is to appeal to it in the course of defending his thesis that we are capable of having perfect knowledge (by acquaintance) of particulars.The defense is necessary because this thesis comes under attack from a certain argument Russell finds in the writings of the Monistic Idealists.

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