Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts

Varadarajan V. Chari

92 citations0/0 files storedThe Quarterly Journal of Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Education and Labor Relations Economic theories and models

Abstract

This paper provides an explanation of involuntary umemployment arising as a consequence of asymmetric information between firms and workers. Involuntary unemployment is defined as a situation where ex post gains to trade exist. A model of labor contracts is developed where the allocations are not ex post optimal. It is shown that inferiority of leisure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of involuntary unemployment.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 92 citations exist upstream.

References

1978Efficient Wage Bargains Under Uncertain Supply and Demand 1975The Importance of Temporary Layoffs: An Empirical Analysis 1986Non-Walrasian Equilibria

Cited by

1986A reduced-form optimal nonlinear income tax problem 1999Chapter 35 Individual employment contracts 1985Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages 1986Chapter 14 The employment relationship: Job attachment, work effort, and the nature of contracts 2005Relying on information acquired by a principal 1985Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints 1990An implicit contract approach to employee stock ownership plans

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.