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On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
4 references·16 citing·39 second hop
On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions (1984)On the Implementability of Reduced Form A…Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Optimal Auctions with Risk Av…Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes (1983)Selling to risk averse buyers…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignAllocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions (1981)Allocation Mechanisms and the…Robust benchmark design (2021)Robust benchmark designMechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments (2020)Mechanism design with costly …Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms (2020)Mechanism Design With Afterma…Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties (2017)Optimal Allocation with Ex Po…Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts (2016)Dynamic Procurement under Unc…Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines (2015)Optimal dynamic mechanism des…Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Mechanism Design and Approxim…The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions (2013)The Simple Economics of Appro…Optimization and mechanism design (2012)Optimization and mechanism de…Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction (2012)Bayesian optimal auctions via…Generalized reduced-form auctions: A network-flow approach (2011)Generalized reduced-form auct…Reduced Form Auctions Revisited (2006)Reduced Form Auctions Revisit…The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass (2004)The Unity of Auction Theory: …Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings (2003)Collusive Practices in Repeat…Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms (1994)Voting and Lottery Drafts as …Chapter 8 Strategic analysis of auctions (1992)Chapter 8 Strategic analysis …Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Non-cooperative games (1989)The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design (2014)Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion (2016)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation (1982)Auctions with entry (1987)Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay (1994)Collusion Under Asymmetric Information (1997)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection (1984)Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions (1994)Optimal Multi-Object Auctions (2000)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process (2012)Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules (2013)Dynamic screening with limited commitment (2015)Incentives in Teams (1973)Making the Most of Your Samples (2015)Ironing in the Dark (2016)Simple versus Optimal Contracts (2019)Bayesian Persuasion (2011)Relational communication (2021)Information design in multistage games (2023)Adversarial coordination and public information design (2025)Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem (1985)On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design (2006)Lies and consequences (2019)Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (1985)Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading (1985)Combinatorial Games under Auction Play (1999)Opportunity Cost Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions (2002)Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective (2015)Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)How Auctions Work for Wine and Art (1989)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1984Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers748 cited
  • 1981Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions310 cited
  • 1983Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes211 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Mechanism Design and Approximation119 cited
  • 2012Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction90 cited
  • 2015Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines85 cited
  • 2020Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms69 cited
  • 2017Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties63 cited
  • 1992Chapter 8 Strategic analysis of auctions62 cited
  • 1994Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms62 cited
  • 2013The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions60 cited
  • 2006Reduced Form Auctions Revisited59 cited
  • 2003Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings52 cited
  • 2020Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments40 cited
  • 2004The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass

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38 cited
  • 2021Robust benchmark design36 cited
  • 2012Optimization and mechanism design36 cited
  • 2016Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts35 cited
  • 2011Generalized reduced-form auctions: A network-flow approach35 cited