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Weak and strong merging of opinions
3 references·16 citing·47 second hop
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this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1976Agreeing to Disagree2,499 cited
  • 1993Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium699 cited
  • 1993Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games141 cited

Cited by

  • 2005Learning in evolutionary environments181 cited
  • 2008Evolution and Intelligent Design152 cited
  • 1995Subjective games and equilibria117 cited
  • 2010Non-Bayesian Learning73 cited
  • 1997Social Learning in Recurring Games67 cited
  • 1999Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information62 cited
  • 1999Calibrated Forecasting and Merging53 cited
  • 2017The Probabilistic Foundations of Rational Learning51 cited
  • 2008Comparative Testing of Experts51 cited
  • 2014Does Belief Heterogeneity Explain Asset Prices: The Case of the Longshot Bias48 cited
  • 1996Can we rationally learn to coordinate?44 cited
  • 1993On adaptive learning in strategic games41 cited
  • 1998Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis36 cited

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  • 2018Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting34 cited
  • 2011Carnap and the Logic of Inductive Inference31 cited
  • 2015MERGING OF OPINIONS AND PROBABILITY KINEMATICS29 cited