Leadership Games in Collective Action

Abstract

The strategic interactions between the leader and the members of the group in collective action are analyzed in a game-theoretical approach. Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma scheme used to formalize a “horizontal” interaction between the members of the group, other schemes are found appropriate to better understand the “vertical” interaction between leaders and followers. The “Battle of the Sexes” game, whose equilibria are found in outcomes in which players do not coincide in their choices, is analyzed as a basic model for interactions in which some people lead and others follow the leaders. Some variants are discussed and the analysis is also extended to N-person games. The analysis supports the conclusion that leadership can explain the creation of organizations for collective action and that leadership effects reinforce the differences in the relative strength of different kinds of groups.

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