Tacit coordination in social dilemmas: The importance of having a common understanding.

Abstract

Previous research has indicated that in social dilemmas, people tacitly coordinate their decisions by using the equal division rule. In 3 experimental studies, the authors investigated the extent to which a common understanding about task and behavioral requirements is essential for the tacit coordination process. The results show that people are less likely to coordinate on the equal division rule when collective feedback on past performance (Study 1), the distribution of information within the group (Study 2), or expected behavioral variance (Study 3) suggests that a common understanding in the group is lacking. Moreover, the results indicate that under these conditions, rather than adhering to the equal division rule, people base their decisions on their own social value orientations. The findings support the view that if situations provide insufficient cues for tacit coordination, people are more likely to decide on the basis of their personal characteristics.

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