Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991

Abstract

Does politics influence judicial retirements? Judicial scholars have long ac knowledged the role of politics in the judicial appointment process and in judicial decision making, but the judicial retirement literature presents divergent conclusions on the effect of politics. We employ an event count model to test the influence of politics on the annual number of voluntary departures from the federal courts of appeals from 1893 through 1991. Our data provide evidence that more judges are likely to retire when politi cal conditions favor the selection of successors sharing their policy views or when unfavorable political conditions appear unlikely to change. These political factors are significant even after controlling for the costs incurred by continued service on the courts, such as diminishing salary, increasing caseload, age, and improved retirement benefits.

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