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Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior
11 references·1 citing·47 second hop
Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior (2007)Bargaining over managerial contracts in d…A note on strategic delegation: The market share case (2006)A note on strategic delegatio…Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: What is the Trigger? (2004)Codes of Good Governance Worl…Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism (2002)Relative performance as a str…Strategic delegation with endogenous costs (1994)Strategic delegation with end…Relative performance evaluation of management (1992)Relative performance evaluati…Delegation and the theory of the firm (1989)Delegation and the theory of …The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives (1987)The Strategic Choice of Manag…The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)The Nash Bargaining Solution …Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment (1985)Managerial incentives as a st…Delegation and the Theory of the Firm (1985)Delegation and the Theory of …Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly (1984)Equilibrium Incentives in Oli…Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies (2016)Endogenous managerial compens…The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (1965)International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy (1983)Export subsidies and international market share rivalry (1985)Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test? (1997)Large Stakes and Big Mistakes (2009)The Economic Design of Sporting Contests (2010)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)On the impact of managerial bonus systems on firm profit and market competition: the cases of pure profit, sales, market share and relative profits compared (2008)Strategic Delegation (2011)Competition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approach (2015)Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of The Firm, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, 332 s. (1964)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice (1997)Executive compensation (2008)Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting (2011)Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information (2011)The Bargaining Problem (1950)A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1964)Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives (1995)Models of Man. (1959)Competitive advantage, creating and sustaining superior performance (1985)Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (1985)The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Delegation (2001)Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility Activities and Corporate Governance in Imperfectly Competitive Markets (2013)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Markets and Hierarchies (1975)ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN OLIGOPOLY * (1989)The Theory of Business Strategy (1989)The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1997)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage (2008)Two-Person Cooperative Games (1953)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Bargaining and Markets (1990)Strategies for the international protection of the environment (1993)The Management of Innovation (1994)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony (1977)The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields (1983)Corporate Social Responsibility in Western Europe: An Institutional Mirror or Substitute? (2009)Corporate Social Responsibility and institutional theory: new perspectives on private governance (2011)Legislating a Woman’s Seat on the Board: Institutional Factors Driving Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors (2014)Aggressiveness and survival of overconfident traders (1998)Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility (2011)The Next Generation of Research on IS Use: A Theoretical Framework of Delegation to and from Agentic IS Artifacts (2021)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1986The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling2,229 cited
  • 1987The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives960 cited
  • 1985Delegation and the Theory of the Firm786 cited
  • 1984Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly688 cited
  • 1989Delegation and the theory of the firm670 cited
  • 2004Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: What is the Trigger?652 cited
  • 1985Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment221 cited
  • 2006A note on strategic delegation: The market share case192 cited
  • 2002Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism153 cited
  • 1992Relative performance evaluation of management151 cited
  • 1994Strategic delegation with endogenous costs62 cited

Cited by

  • 2016Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies11 cited

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