Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyersMallesh M. Pai, Rakesh Vohra2013-10-03articleJournal of Economic Theory115 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Auction Theory and ApplicationsArt History and Market AnalysisGame Theory and Voting SystemsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 115 citations exist upstream.References1981Optimal Auction Design1984Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers1998Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening1998Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders1981Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions2000The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer1983Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes2001Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained BiddersCited by2014Mechanism Design and Approximation2021Redistribution Through Markets2015Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines2014Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach