Multi-Item Auctions

Gabrielle Demange · David Gale · Jorge Sotomayor

600 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item. Assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items, it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal, in a suitable sense, for the bidders. In this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms: one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degree of accuracy.

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1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS

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