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Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects

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2019Fair Division in the Internet Age92 cited
2009Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information65 cited
2008Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms

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51 cited

2010Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies41 cited

2009Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments40 cited

2013Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms38 cited