The effects of objective feedback on performance when individuals receive fixed and individual incentive pay

Abstract

We examined whether objective feedback would enhance performance when individuals were paid monetary incentives. A two-by-two factorial design was used, with 123 college students assigned to incentive pay without feedback, incentive pay with feedback, fixed pay without feedback, or fixed pay with feedback. Participants attended six sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer. Two-factor ANCOVAs were used to determine whether the number of checks completed correctly and time spent working differed. The number of checks completed correctly during a pretest was used as the covariate to control for keyboard proficiency. Incentives increased the number of checks completed correctly by 34 percent (p<.001, standardized effect size=.91); however, feedback had no effect (p=1.00). The incentives increased the time spent working by 31 percent (p<.001, standardized effect size=1.13); however, again feedback had no effect (p=1.00). Although speculative, the results imply that feedback per se, absent evaluation, is unlikely to increase performance even when correlated with performance-contingent rewards.

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