Deficits, inflation and central banks' independence: evidence from developing nations

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9 citations0/0 files storedApplied Economics Letters

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Global Financial Crisis and Policies Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

Deficits should Granger-cause inflation in developing countries since the central banks are not autonomous. Nevertheless, our empirical results refute the causality between government deficits and inflation in a study of ten developing countries.

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References

1969Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-spectral Methods 1972MONEY, INCOME, AND CAUSALITY 1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes 1989Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies 1982INFLATION AND GOVERNMENT DEFICITS 1981Deficits, money and inflation 1978Deficits, government spending, and inflation

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