Representation and reality

Abstract

Part 1 Meaning and mentalism: Fodor and Chomsky three reasons why mentalism can't be right connections between 1,2, and 3. Part 2 Meaning, other people and the world: the division of linguistic labour elms, beeches and searle the contribution of the environment an indexical component other natural kinds references and theory change meaning and Mental Representation. Part 3 Fodor and Block on Narrow Content: narrow content as a Function of Observable Properties Narrow Content and Conceptual Role concluding remarks. Part 4 Are there such things as reference and truth?: why Folk Psychology and not Folk Logic? disquotation, anyone? the Semantical Conception of truth disquotation as disappearance. Part 5 Why functionalism didn't work: sociofunctionalism what In Principle means here the single-computational-state version of functionalism equivalence surveying rationality. Part 6 Other forms of functionalism: David Lewis and I Lewis's theory further examined conclusion. Part 7 A sketch of an alternative picture: objectivity and conceptual relativity internal realism as an alternative picture my present diagnosis of the Functionalism issue.

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