The Effect of New Legislation on the Disclosure of Performance Indicators: The Case of Spanish Local Governments

Abstract

This article analyzes the effect of new accounting legislation on the disclosure of performance indicators in the financial statements of Spanish local governments. Based on agency and institutional theories, the article also assesses whether the disclosure of performance indicators is used to make the monitoring of local government performance easier for stakeholders or merely to project an image of good management. The results show that the enactment of new legislation has only led to a partial implementation, most local governments disclosing financial and budgetary indicators but very few providing indicators related to the performance of public services. The institutional theory (symbolic value) seems to be the rationale that best explains this pattern of disclosure.

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