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More monitoring can induce less effort
16 references·1 citing·34 second hop
More monitoring can induce less effort (1996)More monitoring can induce less effortEconomics, Organization and Management. (1993)Economics, Organization and M…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework (1985)Income tax compliance in a pr…Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing (1984)Regulation, Asymmetric Inform…Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes (1984)Economic Contests: Comparativ…Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms (1984)Congressional Oversight Overl…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Risk Sharing and Incentives i…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Optimal contracts and competi…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilitySupervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm (1978)Supervision, Loss of Control,…Insurance, Information, and Individual Action (1971)Insurance, Information, and I…Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size (1967)Hierarchical Control and Opti…Constituency Influence in Congress (1963)Constituency Influence in Con…Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (2001)Competitive prizes: when less…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture (1991)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)The American Voter. By A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1960. Pp. viii, 573. $8.50.) (1960)Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew (1975)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Rethinking Representation (2003)The concept of power (2007)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets (1980)The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework (1998)Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes (2000)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Book Review: Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. By MORRIS P. FIORINA. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. Pp. 105. $2.95.) (1977)The New Economics of Organization (1984)The Path to European Integration (1996)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust (1995)Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms (1996)Upper Echelons Theory: An Update (2007)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Socialist System (1992)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories (1992)
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References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1993Economics, Organization and Management.4,644 cited
  • 1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification3,201 cited
  • 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,949 cited
  • 1963Constituency Influence in Congress2,306 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,933 cited
  • 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 1967Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size1,050 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1971Insurance, Information, and Individual Action617 cited
  • 1978Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm468 cited
  • 1985Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework446 cited
  • 1984Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes391 cited
  • 1984Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing

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  • 2001Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort28 cited