Garrett on the Consistency of Hume's Philosophy

Abstract

Hume Studies Volume XXIV, Number 1, April 1998, pp.161-169 SYMPOSIUM A version of this paper was presented at the symposium on Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy by Don Garrett, held at the XXIVth International Hume Conference, Monterey, California, July 1997. Garrett on the Consistency of Hume's Philosophy ROBERTJ. FOGELIN Under the influence of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, I have moved through three stages in my attitude toward inconsistency. First I became convinced that inconsistency in a system of beliefs or in a system of rules need not render such a system useless. My reason for thinking this was that paradoxes, for example the Liar Paradox and the Russell Paradox, actually do obtain in our language and yet, for all that, our language serves a wide range of useful purposes. The second stage in the development of my seemingly permissive attitude toward inconsistency was to reject the hermeneutical principle that, in the interest of charity, one should strain every fiber to avoid attributing an inconsistency to a philosopher of stature. It now seems to me that interpretations that avoid attributions of inconsistency at all costs can sometimes be more distorting than interpretations that grant the existence of inconsistency and try to understand its sources. Thirdly, I came to think that it is characteristic of most great philosophic positions to be deeply impregnated with inconsistency or with other forms of incoherence. This is because inconsistency and other forms of incoherence are standing threats to any system of beliefs that is both conceptually rich and selfreflective —features commonly found in important philosophical positions. This strikes me as true of the philosophical positions of Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein and some others. Since I also include Hume in this pantheon, it is understandable why I greeted Don Garrett's superb book, Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy,1 with mixed Robert J. Fogelin is at the Department of Philosophy, 6035 Thornton Hall, Dartmouth College, Hanover NH 03755-3592 USA. email: Robert.J.Fogelin@Dartmouth.edu 162 Robert J. Fogelin feelings. If Garrett is right, then there is nary an inconsistency—or nary an inconsistency of substance—to be found anywhere in Hume's philosophical writings. What's to be done to protect Hume against such a leveling charge? I'm not sure. I'll take Hume's essay on miracles as a starting point, because it provides a clear case of a supposed inconsistency that Garrett attempts to resolve which I, in contrast, wish to preserve. First an exegetical point. There has, as Garrett remarks, been considerable disagreement among commentators concerning what thesis Hume intended to establish in the first part of this essay. This strikes me as an inappropriate way of approaching the text since Hume plainly attempts to establish a number of theses in Part I of the essay. We might, of course, want to ask a different question. What, at least in Hume's opinion, is the most basic thesis he was attempting to establish? The answer to that question seems to be given by Hume in the following passage: There must...be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior. Having drawn this conclusion, Hume then goes on to say: The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish....' (EHU 115-116, emphasis added)2 I have italicized the expression "the plain consequence is" in order to press home the fact that Hume's thesis concerning the level of support that testimony can give in behalf of the occurrence of a miracle is explicitly stated as a consequence of the thesis that, in every case, there is "a direct and...

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