Planning and control in the U.S. Federal Government: A critical analysis of PPB, MBO and ZBB

Abstract

Abstract PPB, MBO and ZBB have each been implemented in the U.S. Federal government, ostensibly as means for facilitating planning and control in agencies and programmes. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the use of these techniques as management tools, political strategies and ritualistic symbols using concepts discussed in the organizational theory, planning and control, and policy science literatures. Two basic conclusions emerge from the evaluation. First, PPB, MBO and ZBB may inappropriately encourage the use of an analytical, computational decision strategy, and a cost/benefit method of performance assessment at a level within the organization and in environmental settings which call for an inspirational decision strategy and social test performance assessment. As a result, environmental variety may not be matched by an organizational response which is equally variable. Secondly, PPB, MBO and ZBB may have been used more as political strategies and ritualistic symbols for controlling and directing controversy by both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Federal government and less as management tools for improving decision making within the U.S. Federal bureaucracy. These management tools give the appearance of rationality in the formulation of public policy which is consistent with man's need for confidence building and conflict avoidance in running the affairs of state.

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