Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints

Richard E. Levitan · Martín Shubik

292 citations0/0 files storedInternational Economic Review

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Merger and Competition Analysis Game Theory and Applications Economic theories and models

Abstract

Abstract : The paper examines an extremely simple model of a duopoly situation in which the two firms compete with price as the strategic variable and in which the firms are limited by capacity constraints. Some of the important developments of duopoly theory concerned with the existence of equilibrium is reviewed. Such a market, as Edgeworth showed, does not in general have an equilibrium. It is shown that the model described in the report has a rather simply described equilibrium in mixed strategies.

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2020Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth 1960Strategy and Market Structure 1925Papers Relating to Political Economy.

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1986Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly 1977Mixed pricing in oligopoly 1985Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints 1989Chapter 6 Theories of oligopoly behavior 1986Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets 1996Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry 2004Coffee, Co-operatives and Competition: The Impact of Fair Trade 1988Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes

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