How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective

Miriam Nicole Flickinger · Markus Wrage · Anja Christine Tuschke · Rudi K. F. Bresser

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Corporate Finance and Governance Gender Diversity and Inequality Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism

Abstract

In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Taking a social status perspective, we argue that an individual's board network embeddedness—as reflected in the number of outside directorships—plays an important role in dismissal decisions. We predict that a high status of the CEO relative to the chairman of the board protects an underperforming CEO against dismissal, while the relative salience of board network outsiders can counter this effect. Using longitudinal data of large German corporations, we find support for our predictions. Ltd. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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References

1960A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences 2003A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.1988Outside directors and CEO turnover 1992POWER IN TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS: DIMENSIONS, MEASUREMENT, AND VALIDATION.1970The Elementary Structures of Kinship.1996What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates 1988Stock prices and top management changes

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