Article2014

Improving Outcomes in Fiscal Federalism: Local Political Leadership and Administrative Capacity

Jessica N. Terman · Richard Clark Feiock

105 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Local Government Finance and Decentralization Public Policy and Administration Research Political Systems and Governance

Abstract

This study investigates how the political influence of local elected officials and the administrative capacities of local administrative agencies together shape outcomes in fiscal federalism. The results demonstrate that differences in support and direct involvements of local officials in federally funded energy programs influence the timeliness of implementation processes. Direct mayoral involvement in the grant application process increases the likelihood of on-time or early implementation of public projects, but direct city council involvement increases implementation time. On the other hand, general policy support from mayors and council members for these efforts, without direct involvement in program design, made on-time or early implementation of public projects more likely. Este estudo investiga como a influência política de administradores locais eleitos e a capacidade administrativa das agências administrativas locais geram resultados no federalismo fiscal. Os resultados demonstram que diferenças no suporte e envolvimento direto de oficiais locais em programas de energia financiados pelo governo federal influenciam o cronograma dos processos de implementação. O envolvimento direto dos prefeitos no processo de aplicação de recursos aumenta a probabilidade de pontualidade ou mesmo implementação antecipada dos projetos públicos, mas o envolvimento direto da Câmara dos Vereadores aumenta o tempo de implementação. Por outro lado, o apoio político de prefeitos e vereadores para estes esforços, sem envolvimento direto no desenho do programa, aumenta a probabilidade dos projetos serem antecipados ou entregues na data certa. Translated by Ricardo Gomes, University of Brasília

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 105 citations exist upstream.

References

1999An Essay on Fiscal Federalism 2002The Tools of government: a guide to the new governance 2000The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering 1985The Political Economy of Federalism 1984Implementation and Public Policy 1981The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists 1995Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect 2009Policy analytical capacity and evidence‐based policy‐making: Lessons from Canada

Cited by

2015Applying Policy Termination Theory to the Abandonment of Climate Protection Initiatives by U.S. Local Governments 2020Interactive Political Leadership 2022The quality of government and administrative performance: explaining Cohesion Policy compliance, absorption and achievements across EU regions 2019A bayesian approach for behavioral public administration: Citizen assessments of local government sustainability performance 2024Service Delivery During Crises: The Effects of Organizational Capacity, Collaboration, and Public Service Motivation on Organizational Resilience

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.