PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation

Abstract

It is often believed that organized interests purchase access--and, consequently, representation--to members of Congress through PAC contributions. By contributing to representatives from districts where they have little or no organizational strength, groups may shift the representational focus of elected officials away from geographic constituencies to broader, functional constituencies based on occupational, industrial, and professional groupings. This paper examines this possibility by assessing the extent to which groups' campaign contributions and lobbying efforts are directed to representatives from districts where groups have little or no organizational presence. The empirical analysis is based on data from a survey of professional lobbyists with organizations that sponsored political action committees during the 1983-1984 election cycle. Results of the analysis indicate that organized interests seldom contribute to and lobby members of the U.S. House of Representatives in the absence of geographic ties to their districts.

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