Monetary Policy Preferences of Individual FOMC Members: A Content Analysis of the Memoranda Of Discussion

Henry W. Chappell · Thomas M. Havrilesky · Rob Roy McGregor

29 citations0/0 files storedThe Review of Economics and Statistics

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Computational and Text Analysis Methods

Abstract

The Memoranda of Discussion provide detailed records of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting deliberations. Procedures are developed for coding the textual data in the Memoranda and assessing the reliability of those codings. The codings are then used in the estimation of parameters of individual FOMC members' reaction functions. Data from the 1970 to 1976 period are employed in the estimation. In the future, similar methods could be used to analyze newly released transcripts of FOMC meetings held after 1976.

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1990Basic Content Analysis 1970Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities.1980Krippendorff, Klaus, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980.1989Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz 1991Interest rates and the conduct of monetary policy 1993Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment 1995THE RELATION BETWEEN NARRATIVE AND MONEY MARKET INDICATORS OF MONETARY POLICY 1993The Pressures on American Monetary Policy

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