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ABSTRACT Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are ‘stretched’ by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and non‐overboarded outside directors.
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Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 295 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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