Presidents, Justices, and Deference to Administrative Action

Abstract

This article examines the effect of the relationship between the president and Supreme Court Justices on justices' voting in administrative law cases. I evaluate Cohen and Spitzer's theory that justices tailor the pro- or antideference signal sent to the lower courts based on their relationship with the sitting president. The results show, contrary to the theory of Cohen and Spitzer, that justices' votes in administrative law cases are influenced by the ideology of the president under whom the administrative decisions were made rather than by the ideology of the president in office at the time of the Court's decision.

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