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Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
7 references·6 citing·36 second hop
Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition (1990)Subgame perfect implementation: A necessa…Subgame Perfect Implementation (1988)Subgame Perfect ImplementationSocial Goals and Social Organization (1986)Social Goals and Social Organ…The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey (1983)The Theory of Implementation …The Strategy of Social Choice (1983)The Strategy of Social ChoiceDominance Solvable Voting Schemes (1979)Dominance Solvable Voting Sch…Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Reexamination of the perfectn…Theory of voting (1969)Theory of votingSimple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (2013)Simple mechanisms and prefere…Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods (2013)Minimum participation rules f…The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2004)The Theory of Implementation …Implementing a public project and distributing its cost (1992)Implementing a public project…Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem (1989)Mechanism Design with Incompl…Efficient allocation of a “prize”-King Solomon's dilemma (1989)Efficient allocation of a “pr…An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Non-cooperative games (1989)Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Chapter 34 Cost allocation (1994)A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods (1999)A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good (1999)Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences (1990)Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality (1999)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Choosing from a tournament (1986)Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984)Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts (1999)A crash course in implementation theory (2001)Incentives Between Firms (and Within) (2005)The Bargaining Problem (1950)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003 (2005)Strategyproof Social Choice (2011)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information (1992)Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation (2005)Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy (1993)But Who Will Guard the Guardians? (2008)Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information (2008)The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition (1972)Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice (1986)Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass (1992)Welfare, preference and freedom (1991)Institutions and Their Design (1996)The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions (2003)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games3,342 cited
  • 1969Theory of voting634 cited
  • 1988Subgame Perfect Implementation463 cited
  • 1983The Strategy of Social Choice307 cited
  • 1979Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes259 cited
  • 1986Social Goals and Social Organization255 cited
  • 1983The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey223 cited

Cited by

  • 1989Efficient allocation of a “prize”-King Solomon's dilemma115 cited
  • 2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules103 cited
  • 1992Implementing a public project and distributing its cost93 cited
  • 1989Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem79 cited
  • 2013Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty74 cited
  • 2013Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods22 cited

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