Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy, and the Privatization of Public Services

Abstract

This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on redundancy and applies it to the problem of organizing municipal service production. It explores Landau's redundancy theory, and extensions of it by Bendor and Allan Lerner, for insight into the variety of strategies available for the introduction of controlled competition in the delivery of services provided by municipal bureaucracies. The chapter utilizes data on alternative forms of municipal contracting from a large sample of cities to assess evidence for the theoretical position taken in the chapter. By identifying some forms of privatization as forms of redundancy, the chapter evaluates strategic choices in approaches to privatization, assessing them for the improvements they offer in reliability of services and cost-efficiency. The incorporation of redundancy theory can enhance the current frame of reference defined by public choice and economic theory, particularly concerning the appropriate use and form for the privatization of public services and the streamlining of public bureaucracies.

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