this work references cited by second hopReferences
- 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
- 1987The Economic Institutions of Capitalism14,787 cited
- 1986The Economic Institutions of Capitalism10,729 cited
- 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
- 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
- 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims4,877 cited
- 1993Economics, Organization and Management.4,644 cited
- 1981The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance3,652 cited
- 1982Reputation and imperfect information3,093 cited
- 1993A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation3,005 cited
- 1994A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation2,554 cited
- 1982Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma2,494 cited
- 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
- 1950Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy1,617 cited
- 1992Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results1,120 cited
- 1987The choice of organizational form The case of franchising
Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work