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A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations

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References

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1979Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points308 cited

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1988Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation136 cited
2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules103 cited
1995Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information84 cited
1994Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments81 cited
2000Experiments With the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods79 cited
1994Why Politics is More Fundamental Than Economics77 cited
2017R&D Investments in the Presence of Knowledge Spillover and Debt Financing: Can Risk Shifting Cure Free Riding?71 cited
2004Non-excludable public good experiments

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2008Chapter 67 Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research43 cited

2007A fundraising mechanism inspired by historical tontines: Theory and experimental evidence28 cited