The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives

Alessandro Lizzeri · Nicola Persico

822 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Electoral Systems and Political Participation Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a winner-take-all system—where all the spoils go to the winner—to a proportional system—where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote. In a winner-take-all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable. We then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency. (JEL D82, L15)

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References

2019American Economic Review 2002Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy 1975Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew 1981The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics 1997An Economic Model of Representative Democracy 1987Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition 2003Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth 1986Economics of the Public Sector

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