References

• 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
• 2005Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents1,404 cited
• 1992Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement1,085 cited
• 1986Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement724 cited
• 2000‘Public service motivation’ as an argument for government provision541 cited
• 2007The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats496 cited
• 1998Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins482 cited
• 2004Paying For Quality: Providers’ Incentives For Quality Improvement398 cited
• 1994H ealth C are P ayment S ystems : C ost and Q uality I ncentives367 cited
• 2007Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector349 cited
• 1998Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality330 cited
• 1990Optimal payment systems for health services321 cited
• 2006Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation255 cited
• 2004Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment181 cited
• 1998Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality179 cited