Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Reply

Richard Engelbrecht‐Wiggans · John A. List · David Reiley

178 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Auction Theory and Applications Economic and Environmental Valuation Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Reply by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, John A. List and David H. Reiley. Published in volume 95, issue 1, pages 472-476 of American Economic Review, March 2005

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1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS 1995The Handbook of experimental economics 1973Incentives in Teams 1971Multipart pricing of public goods 1996Why Bounded Rationality 2006The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment 2020The Handbook of Experimental Economics 19957. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research

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