THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM AND KALDERON'S MORAL FICTIONALISM

Abstract

Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non‐cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non‐cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non‐cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non‐cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.

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