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Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted
12 references·2 citing·32 second hop
Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted (2002)Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games Wh…Three brief proofs of Arrow?s Impossibility Theorem (2004)Three brief proofs of Arrow?s…The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2004)The Theory of Implementation …Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules (2002)Multi-valued strategy-proof s…Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences (2001)Strategy-proof Social Choice …Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized (2000)Strategic manipulability with…Voting by Committees (1991)Voting by CommitteesStrategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (1983)Strategy-Proofness and Pivota…Strategy and group choice (1978)Strategy and group choiceThe Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance (1977)The Manipulation of Social Ch…Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance (1977)Manipulation of Schemes that …Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Strategy-proof Social Choice (2010)Strategy-proof Social ChoiceTops-only domains (2009)Tops-only domainsSocial Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections (2008)Computational Social Choice (2012)Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting (2019)A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision (1952)Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach (2001)Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation (2005)The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation (1985)Political Institutions (2001)Political institutions: democracy and social choice (2002)Games and Decisions (2015)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Incentives in Public Decision-Making. (1980)Ranking Sets of Objects (2004)A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking (2007)The Bargaining Problem (1950)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Fifty Years of the Nash Program 1953-2003 (2004)Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003 (2005)Strategyproof Social Choice (2011)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Approval Voting (1978)House Allocation with Existing Tenants (1999)When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Aggregating Partially Ordered Preferences (2008)A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one (2012)The Moral Standing of the Market (1985)ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION AND SOCIAL CHOICE: CONTINGENT VALUATION AND THE MARKET ANALOGY (1995)Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 1977Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance443 cited
  • 1991Voting by Committees319 cited
  • 2004Three brief proofs of Arrow?s Impossibility Theorem270 cited
  • 2000Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized174 cited
  • 1977The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance141 cited
  • 1978Strategy and group choice139 cited
  • 2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules103 cited
  • 2001Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences99 cited
  • 1983Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem97 cited
  • 2002Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules81 cited

Cited by

  • 2010Strategy-proof Social Choice61 cited
  • 2009Tops-only domains53 cited

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