CONTROL PATTERNS IN CONTRACTING‐OUT RELATIONSHIPS: IT MATTERS WHAT YOU DO, NOT WHO YOU ARE

Abstract

The contracting‐out of public services has often been accompanied by a strong academic focus on the emergence of new governance forms, and a general neglect of the processes and practices through which contracted‐out services are controlled and monitored. To fill this gap, we draw on contracting‐out and inter‐organizational control literatures to explore the adoption of control mechanisms for public service provision at the municipal level and the variables that can explain their choice. Our results, based on a survey of Italian municipalities, show that in the presence of contracting‐out, market‐, hierarchy‐, and trust‐based controls display different intensities, can coexist, and are explained by different variables. Service characteristics are more effective in explaining market‐ and hierarchy‐based controls than relationship characteristics. Trust‐based controls are the most widespread, but cannot be explained by the variables traditionally identified in contracting‐out and inter‐organizational control studies.

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